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RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9, No. 4

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND THE HISTORICAL METHOD OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTREPRETATION-A REVIEW ARTICLE t
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
Confusion Twice Confounded is sufficiently typical of a growing body
of literature to warrant more extensive treatment than is usually accorded in a book review. It analyzes at great length the opinions in the
Everson 1 and McCollum 2 cases and criticizes them in the light of the
historical background of the First Amendment. 3 Everson, it will be recalled, derived from the Founding Fathers the doctrine that the Constitution required a "wall of separation between church and state," which
was not breached by public payment of transportation to and from parochial schools. McCollum used the test laid down in Everson to invalidate a system whereby school children wishing to do so were given an
opportunity to attend for a short period each week classes of instruction
in the religion of their choice conducted on the school premises. Msgr.
Brady argues that the Founding Fathers, in forbidding laws "respecting an establishment of religion," intended to do no more than forbid
the federal government either to subsidize a religious ministry of
official sanction or to interfere with those subsidized by a number
of the states. He shows us that in our early history no constitutional
objection was raised either to public support of religion generally or
to public assistance whereby persons for whom there was some special
public responsibility (Indians, the military, etc.) could procure the
ministrations of the religion of their choice.
Msgr. Brady comes to us with the credentials of an eminently
qualified historian, and there is no reason to question the historical
accuracy of anything he says. But in delimiting his historical inquiry by the view that the Constitution furnishes one and only one
answer to questions of this sort, discoverable by any fair-minded
person without regard to contemporary political or social institutions,
it seems to this reviewer that he does a disservice to the cause of formulating an alternative to the unfortunate doctrine laid down in the two
decisions under consideration. The canon of constitutional construction he employs is one with which he himself would surely be less
t CONFUSION TwICE CONFOUNDED, by Joseph H. Brady, Seton Hall Press, South
Orange, N. J., 1954. Pp. 192. $3.00.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
i. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

3. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
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than content were it applied in other contexts. It is a narrow examination of the specific purpose of the framers of the provision under consideration. He derives his chief support for it from Taney's opinion
in the Dred Scott case. 4 Taney, following this criterion, held that the
ownership of slaves by some of the Founding Fathers proved that they
intended to exclude members of the Negro race, free or slave, from
the enjoyment of advantages otherwise accorded to human beings as
such under the Constitution. To be sure, there is a certain magnificence
in the relentless logic of this opinion, but we are hardly proud of it today. Nor should Msgr. Brady, who is very much disturbed by Jackson's
avowal in McCollum that he is judging according to his "prepossessions," have failed to notice the correlation between the prepossessions
of the several judges and their holdings in Dred Scott.5
Since Msgr. Brady seems to have oversimplified, the most appropriate
means of reviewing his work is probably to fill in the omitted complexities. This review will accordingly take up the ideological framework in which the historical questions discussed by Msgr. Brady and
the Court present themselves, the manner in which historical material
is used by the Court, and the role of the judicial "prepossession" in the
decision of constitutional cases.
I
The dynamic conception of constitutional interpretation-which
most modern constitutional lawyers consider indispensable to the
survival of a system in which a judicially-enforced constitution plays
,the role it does among us-is probably best stated by Holmes:
, , * when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat
and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must
be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago. 6
If we are to determine what the First Amendment means to. us, rather
than what it meant to the Founding Fathers, we cannot content ourselves, as Msgr. Brady seems to, with determining what the Founding
4. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1857), cited on pages 47 and 91. He cites
as additional authority, Lamar in Lake County v. Rollins, 13o U.S. 662, 670 (1889).

An examination of the language quoted from Lamar in connection with the fact
situation that called it forth will show that no great significance can be attached
to it.
5. For a short and readable narrative of the behind-the-scenes events leading
up to Dred Scott, see HENDRICK, BULWARK
6. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433

OF THE REPUBLIC 320-32 (1937).
(1920).
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Fathers meant to abolish; we must ask ourselves what institution they
meant to found within the shelter of the constitutional prohibition,
and what that institution has become.
While the history needs a great deal more development by specialists
in the field, the impression left with this reviewer by the materials he
has been able to examine 7 is that the Founding Fathers and their
early nineteenth-century successors-at least the more articulate of
them-proposed that the ethical foundations of the nation be placed
in a body of principles under which everyone could be expected to
work harmoniously toward the fulfillment of the high temporal promise
of America, rather than in "sectarian" beliefs or hierarchies, whose
"establishment" would result in internal discord. The body of ethical
standards thus relied on to give the requisite moral cohesiveness to
civil society will be referred to hereafter as the Official Ethic. Its proponents seem to have regarded it as stemming more from principles
of political theory than from theological principles, although the presupposition necessary to the erection of any such structure would
seem to be that of a certain type of Protestant Christianity -that
there is a broad area in which the determination of the individual
conscience is not subject to any kind of societal responsibility. The
fact that those who do not share this presupposition-including
this reviewer-regard it as theological does not keep it from claiming in the light of history a favored place in our constitutional framework.9 It is on account of this favored position that the embodiment
of the Official Ethic in the public school system has been regarded as
constitutionally unexceptionable, and has sometimes been regarded as
entitled to constitutional protection against competing systems.
There seems little doubt that in the early days of the country the
Official Ethic in the minds of many, if not most, Americans, contained
7. Chiefly,

4 and 5 (1953), 1 STOKES,
4, and particularly §§ 7 and 8 (195o),
AMERICAN SECULAR SCHOOL, C. 1 (1951), and,

PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM CC.

CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES C.

and

THAYER, THE ATrACK UPON THE

of course, the work under review.
8. Howe, Book Review, 64

sions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.

HARV. L. REV. 170 (1950);
PROB. 23, 27-31 (1949).

Murray, Law or Preposses-

9. Here this reviewer must disagree with Fr. Murray, supra note 8. He contends
that as the view that religion is a private matter is a theological view, it cannot
have been given a favored position under the First Amendment, since the First
Amendment requires the State to be neutral as between theological views. But it
would seem that the view that religion is a private matter is both a theological and

a political view. Which it is primarily depends on which of the two fields of study
is regarded as having the pre-eminence over the other. To a person who believes
that religion is not merely a private matter, but the subject of certain responsibilities
on the part of society, theology sets- limits on the area of inquiry appropriate to
political philosophy. But to one who believes that religion is a private matter,

the areas of inquiry open to theology are probably delimited by political theory,

see Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 409-10 (1854). Thus, to those who accept the
view that religion is a private matter, it seems to be a political view, although to

those who reject it, it is a theological view.
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large elements of "nonsectarian" Christianity-elements that have
gradually been squeezed out by the influx of new ideas and new populations, whereby the spectrum of divergence widened, and what was
once nonsectarian became sectarian. It is this earlier deposit of nonsectarian Christianity in the Official Ethic that seems to have been
the basis for some of the considerations advanced by Msgr. Brady to
show that the views of the Founding Fathers and their immediate
successors were not in accord with the views advanced by the judges
in Everson and McCollum. But the plans under attack in those two
cases did not involve a teaching of nonsectarian religion as part of the
Official Ethic; they were definitely sectarian, being calculated to facilitate the education of the child in the religion of his choice by the
ministers of that religion.
As Msgr. Brady shows us, Jefferson proposed for his University of
Virginia a scheme not unlike that stricken down in McCollum whereby
the various religious denominations would be invited to establish
theological schools in the vicinity of the campus, with certain facilities
of the University made available to them and to their students. This
proposal might have set the pattern for the development of the public
schools, but it did not; rightly or wrongly, the decision when the public
schools were established was in favor of teaching the moral principles
underlying the state as part of the regular curriculum of the nonsectarian school. Thus, the plans involved in Everson and McCollum
represent departures from the institution as it has developed, which
departures stem not from the suggestions of Jefferson, but from the
felt needs of the present.
After this brief historical review, we are in a position to examine
the claims of the ideological groups that seem to have been before the
Court in the cases under consideration. These seem to be basically
three in number:
i. Those who believe that the primary concern of mankind should
be an earthly happiness to be achieved through the means of the state
or of some decision procedure like those used in running the state.
These tend to reject as un-American any religious view that denies
the absolute subjection of the things of this world to such a decision
procedure, while proclaiming the liberty of every citizen to take such
measures concerning the next world as may occur to him, subject to
that proviso. They regard the public school as an institution to prepare the child to take his place in the striving toward earthly happiness, and emphasize national unity, usually on the basis of common
adherence to the favorite decision procedure.' 0 Whatever leads school
io. The nature of the decision procedure thus adhered to varies. Mr. Paul

Blanshard, for instance, shows himself a believer in democracy:
"Catholic dialectitians like to describe the infallibility of the Pope as something which resembles the power of the United States Supreme Court. 'See,'
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children to be conscious of religious differences they deplore as "divisive." It is not difficult to see in the tenets of this group the basis
for Mrs. McCollum's attack on the Champaign plan or Mr. Everson's
attack on the payment of bus fares to parochial school students.
they argue, 'you have a supreme authority in the United States to act as final
arbiter under your constitution, and we have a supreme authority under our
constitution. It is natural and fitting that such authority should exist.' The
analogy is not accurate. The power of the United States Supreme Court is
derived from the people, and the people could abolish the Court if they
wished to do so by constitutional amendment. The members of the Court
are chosen by an elected official and confirmed by an elected Senate. Their
power is carefully limited because they are subject to impeachment and trial
by an elected body. They have never claimed divine or even juridical infallibility in anything. The Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope does
not provide for any of these democratic safeguards or limitations." AMERICAN
FREEDOM, AND CATHOLIC POWER

26

(1949).

Mr. Vivian Thayer has a more subtle technique:
"The secular method merely applies to religion a logic that has yielded good
fruit in other fields. It is a way of thinking and living which while not
exclusively American, is, nevertheless, a unique outgrowth of American

experience.

"Herbert Agar has described this method in his volume, The Price of Union.
The price of union, according to Agar, has been the spirit of accommodation,
a willingness of local groups with intense conviction to work hand in hand in
the same political party with the partisans of other interests. This self-discipline,
or, if you will, a disposition to face reality and to accept half a loaf rather
than to press for a whole loaf, has welded together a highly diverse people
into one nation and has created a spirit of unity and common action in local
and regional groups of different interests and, often, conflicting ideologies."
An "Experimentalist" Position in AMERICAN EDUCATION AND RELIGION 19, 31-2
(Johnson ed. 1952).
That Mr. Blanshard has put his trust in the things of this world is probably best
illustrated in his chapter on The Church and Medicine, op. cit, supra at 107-31,
where he insists that such subjects as the morality of therapeutic abortion should
be decided by doctors, not by experts in moral theology. He seems also to be
shocked at the view that the saving of souls in the sickroom is more important than
the saving of bodies. Mr. Thayer's decision procedure is perhaps more appealing
than Mr. Blanshard's, but he unites with Mr. Blanshard when he makes of a decision
procedure a way of life:
"This training in democratic thinking and living seeks neither to impose
principles dogmatically upon the young nor to leave them rudderless, possessed
only of an 'open mind.' Those who accuse the secular school of a failure to
breed conviction, particularly in a democratic faith, overlook the fact that
the method of which I have given but a shorthand description, when seen
in its full implications, is in itself a structure that will constitute a sound
foundation upon which one can ground his life." Op. cit. supra note 7, at 32.
"The conquest of the continent thus operated to loosen and to free American
society in every way, intellectually, socially, economically, and politically.
Men oriented themselves less with reference to the past and the life hereafter,
and more and more with respect to the promise of the good life on this earth.
In the preparation of young people for an open future the school came to
play an ever more pregnant role." Id. at 22.
What gives us the clearest insight into Mr. Thayer's principles of mutual accomodation is that he is more anxious to teach them than to use them in resolving disagreements over what to teach.
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This group received two checks in the Supreme Court, one in the
Pierce " case, which held that parents who wished to send their
children to private schools could not be compelled to send them to
the public schools in the interest of national unity, and one in the Barnette 12 case, which held that a child who did go to the public school
could not be compelled unwillingly to make a symbolic obeisance to
the principle of national unity.
With this group are often joined some of the less numerous religious
minorities, who, while aware that the public school does not meet
their religious needs, fear that they will be overlooked in any attempt
to meet the needs of the more numerous denominations or will be set
apart in invidious ways from the majority.' 3
2. Religious persons, chiefly Protestants, who accept the principle of
separation of Church and State, together with that of the unitary public
school system, but who deplore the elimination of "nonsectarian" religion
from the Official Ethic as taught in the public schools.1 4 They accept
systems like the released-time program involved in McCollum as a solution, somewhat less than satisfactory, for the problem raised by this
elimination.' 5
Basic, perhaps, to the whole decision procedure orientation is the individualistic
hierarchy of values:
"The Educational Policies Commission has said, 'By moral and spiritual
values we mean those values which, when applied in human behavior, exalt
and refine life and bring it into accord with the standards of conduct that
are approved in our democratic culture.'
"It answers the question, 'What things are good?' by enumerating ten
moral and spiritual values.
"First in the list is the supreme importance of the individual personality.
This is declared to be basic, with all other values dependent on it."
CONGRESS OF PARENTS AND TEACHERS, MORAL
HOME, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY 5-6 (1953).

AND

SPIRITUAL

NATIONAL
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IN

For an integration of most of the shapes taken by individualism since the Middle

Ages, see

HUGHES, THE CHURCH AND THE LIBERAL SOCIETY (1944).

II. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
12. West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
13. This seems to be the thrust of Greenberg, A Jewish Educator's View in
AMERICAN EDUCATION AND RELIGION

39 (Johnson ed.

1952).

See also Mr. Pfeffer's

account of the experience of the Jewish community in Montreal under the educational system prevailing in Quebec Province. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
42-5 (1953).
14. Harner, A Protestant Educator's View in AMERICAN EDUCATION AND RELIGION
77 (Johnson ed. 1952). This distinction between religion as such, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the institutional church and the sectarian creed, would seem to
rest on presuppositions peculiar to Protestantism-presuppositions which Prof.
Harner lists as the supremacy of Scripture over tradition, of faith over works, and
of the Christian people over an exclusive priesthood. Private interpretation is at
the heart of any such system, and the institutional church is a mere grouping of
such interpretations, with no special divine mandate attached to its particular
forms or formulations. There is required, however, something on which the private
interpretations of all are to operate. See Hale v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9 (1868).
15. The record in McCollum indicates a certain amount of nonsectarian
pressure in the plan under attack. See particularly the testimony of Mr. Cartlidge
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3. Catholics, and adherents of a certain number of other religious
bodies, who believe that religious education is necessary for the child
and cannot be achieved in a school that is not religiously oriented
throughout. At the same time, they attach sufficient importance to
their distinctive doctrines or to their institutional churches to deny
the efficacy of nonsectarian religion to achieve the orientation they
require. Catholics, at least, and perhaps some others of this group,
feel that if the State is going to enter into the educational field at all,
it is only fair that it subsidize in some measure parochial education,
the only kind that fully meets their needs. 16 These, like Group 2,
accept the released-time system but are not fully satisfied with it.
This reviewer, although his religious convictions place him in
Group 3, is disposed to concede that, as regards-the ideological foundations of public education, Group i represents the legitimate claim
to the heirship of the Founding Fathers. This is not to say that the
Founding Fathers would have accepted all the tenets of this group as
they now appear. But those tenets flow from the premises on which
the Founding Fathers acted, by a line of gradual development whereby
.some premises were abandoned, others embroidered upon. The thrust
in the direction of submerging the divergent religious beliefs under
the common experiences of temporal achievement seems to this reviewer to be unmistakable from the start. This may indicate in what
sense the Court might have been justified in calling on the Founding
Fathers to support the various opinions in Everson and McCollum,
and in what sense Msgr. Brady is not justified in calling on them to
,castigate the Court.
II
With the problem posed in this form, it is the authors of the schemes
under attack in the Everson and McCollum cases who must ask the
beginning at p. 155, that of Mr. Mellon on p. 127, and the following statement
from the trial court's opinion, pp. 6o, 66: "The testimony shows that sectarian
differences between the sects are not taught or emphasized in the actual teaching
as it is conducted in the schools." The church authorities seem to have attempted
to supervise the curriculum in such a way as to prevent any religious teacher
from teaching things "antagonistic" to any other religion. In addition, there seems
to have been considerable reluctance to permit the various Protestant denominations
to establish programs of their own in lieu of the nondenominational Protestant
teaching that was in a flourishing state. The division of military chaplains into
Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish categories seems to present similar problems.
i6. See Hochwalt, A Catholic Educator's View in AMERICAN EDUCATION AND
61 (Johnson ed. 1952). The Catholic position in this respect would seem
to find justification in Mr. Blanshard's confidence in the public school system as
a means of perpetuating his views at the expense of theirs: e.g.: "My own conviction
is that the outcome of the struggle between American democracy and the Catholic
hierarchy depends upon the survival and expansion of the public school." AMERICAN
RELIGION

FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 286 (1949). Anyone familiar with Catholic doctrine
will see from a reading of Mr. Blanshard's book that his attack, although purportedly directed at the hierarchy, goes to the heart of the Catholic religion.
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Court to set out in a new direction. On what basis can this be asked?
There is some indication that the Official Ethic is taking on a new
religious content; this may be the meaning of the well-known language
of Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson." But this would not be enough to
sustain the plans under attack; indeed, it would not be enough to
support the decision in Zorach. What is called for is some fractionalization of the hitherto monolithic Official Ethic, or else a holding
that the State may support in some ways moral or religious postulates
other than the Official Ethic without establishing a religion.
As has been seen, we cannot at this late date revive Jefferson's plan
for the University of Virginia merely because Jefferson proposed it.
We must point to a living tradition on which the Court may base
the holding we seek. Once outside the monolithic public school system,
we will have little difficulty in finding such a tradition. Msgr. Brady
points in the right direction by his insistence on the wording of the
First Amendment, which forbids not a law establishing a religion, but
a law respecting an establishment of religion, whether for it or against
it. An important purpose of the Amendment thus worded, he shows
us, was to protect from federal interference the establishments existing
in many of the states at the time the Constitution was adopted. This
sets a tone to the document which the Court ignores, and which Msgr.
Brady does not develop as well as he should. Even granting that insofar
as the First Amendment imports an ideology that ideology is Protestant
in principle, our institutions have as much in them of compromise as
of ideology.
Thus, as Msgr. Brady points out, the Founding Fathers were not so
doctrinaire as to neglect the opportunity to pacify a tribe of Catholic
Indians by sending them priests. Nor did they neglect to provide their
armed forces with religious ministrations, even though such ministrations are necessarily sectarian.
One of the best illustrations of this pluralistic impetus at work is
in the field of church polity. In the early days of our legal system,
there seems to have been a strong tendency toward a monolithic approach. It was considered that constitutional principles respecting
religion could be served only by treating all religions alike and resolving their temporal affairs under some doctrine of private law, such as
that of charitable trusts, or that of voluntary associations. At the same
time, there was a strong bias in favor of democracy within the several
church organizations, even those whose theological tenets required
a hierarchical government. In the end, however, the view that
the religious body has the right to rule its own juridical destinies
through the governmental organs that are established in it-the
17. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 3o6 (1952). See also 68 STAT. 249 (1954), amending
36 U.S.C. § 172 (1952) by inserting "under God" after "one nation" in the flag
salute.
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pluralistic view-triumphed completely; today, no other is compatible
with the federal Constitution.1 8 This development is responsive to
the very real needs of various religious bodies unable to fit into the
mold imposed on them by the monolithic view. Similar accommodations to the varying religious views in the community are everywhere
to be observed.
In other words, while the historical claim of the monolithic view
to the control of the public school system is very strong, the public
schools as they have developed are an aberration in the general picture
of our society, which is pluralistic. The basic trend of our society is,
to accommodate divergent views, not to suppress them. Indeed, in the,
public school system itself, the Supreme Court has stricken down
forms of implementation of the Official Ethic whenever the element
of compulsion became too insistent. Thus, while the State may instill
in the public school child the tenets of this Ethic, it cannot force from
him a profession of assent. 19 And while it can offer financial advantages to parents to make their children part of this captive audience,
it cannot use coercion on those parents who wish to forego these advantages and send their children to a school whose moral postulates.
20
are agreeable to their own.
Our society, then, is pluralistic as well as democratic. It exerts
pressures toward conformity, but places effective limits on how strong
those pressures may be made. With this principle in mind, we may
have a basis for a critical evaluation of the Court's position in Everson
and McCollum.
III
To sum up the foregoing, it appears that democracy and civil liberty
as we know them have from the outset meant different things to different people. To the Founding Fathers, and perhaps to a majority
of Americans even today, they represent an ideological basis for society,
rooted in a habit of mind that accepts no absolute moral values of
universal applicability. Behind this habit of mind lies the premise,
sometimes articulated, always implicit, that there are no such values,
or that none have yet been discovered. From such a premise, it follows
that all solutions to life's problems are tentative, depending on the
social context and the needs of the individual personality. To so
empiric a way of life, the readiness to give all viewpoints a hearing,
and to abandon such as have outlived their usefulness, is vital. Liberty,
then, is regarded as the civil manifestation of the right of the individual
to act on such tentative solutions as may commend themselves to him
18. This history is traced out in the cases in chapters I and 2 of HOWE, CASES ON
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1952). See also Professor Howe's foreword
to The Supreme Court, 1952 Term, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953).
19. West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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and democracy as the necessary limitation on liberty in the interest of
enabling other individuals to do the same. What has been referred to
as the Official Ethic has become a shifting congeries of values with
these principles at the core.
In contradistinction to the adherents of this doctrine are those who
believe in a system of absolute values to which their neighbors ought
to adhere, but which seem inappropriate for implementation as such
by means available to the civil State. To these, the cement of our
society is not the "right" of the individual to act on such solutions as
commend themselves to him, but charity, a virtue which moves them
to live in harmony with their neighbors even if persuaded that the
latter err, and err grievously. 21 Under this view, liberty and democracy
are adhered to as appropriate civil manifestations of that charity, but
not as absolutes.
The difference between these two viewpoints is often submerged in
the day-to-day workings of society, but it becomes quite apparent in
the field of education, where the presence of an ideological element
is regarded on all sides as necessary. To those who hold the first of these
viewpoints, liberty and democracy are that ideological element. To
those who hold the second, they are not: to those who regard as central
an ideology of moral absolutes, liberty and democracy, however desirable as solutions to the problems they address, cannot be more than
secondary concerns.
We have seen that the claim of the former, ideological, view of
liberty and democracy to embodiment in the public school system has
.a strong historical basis, but that the claim of any peaceable group
of citizens to be accommodated in accordance with their own needs
is at least equally strong, and that the proponents of the plans under
attack in the two cases under consideration must sustain them, if at
all,\ by persuading the Court to apply the latter principle at the expense of the former. What basis have they for asking the Court to do
this?
The chief basis is that there has been a decision by the appropriate
political authorities, who have worked out an adjustment between
the conflicting demands of the two principles. Religion is accommodated, not established. In each case the public school, faithful to its
historical background, adheres to the ideology of the Official Ethic,
with only a minimal concession to the dissenter. In one case, he is
allowed to bring in, at no public expense, a person to instruct him
for half an hour a week in the ideology in which he believes; in the
other case, he is given the bus fare to go somewhere else.
21.

Thus, Archbishop Carroll, the founder of the American hierarchy, is quoted

with respect to his flock as wishing ".

.

. to preserve in their hearts a warm charity

and forbearance toward every other denomination of Christians, and at the same

time to preserve them from that fatal and prevailing indifference which views all

religions as equally acceptable to God and salutary to men ..
,CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 331 (1950).

" quoted in I STOKES,
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22
Nor are these concessions being demanded as constitutional right.

Quite the opposite: having been accorded, they are under constitutional
attack from adherents of the ideology officially embodied in the public
school. The inversion whereby the intransigent among the in-group
thus make use of the Bill of Rights to suppress moderate concessions to
the out-group is flimsily grounded, to say the least. Mr. Eyerson complains that some of his tax money is being diverted to allow other citizens to seek on their own terms what they cannot accept on his. Mrs.
McCollum complains that allowing others to stand up for what they believe in embarrasses her little boy by making it necessary for him to do
the same. Despite the ideological content of the First Amendment, its
place in our constitutional structure, like that of all the Bill of Rights,
is properly as a vindication of individuality or pluralism against political pressures to conform; the use to which Mr. Everson and Mrs.
McCollum attempt to put it would make of it instead an additional
23
instrument of conformist pressure.

With these considerations in mind, we are perhaps in a position to
examine the result actually reached by the Court in the two cases.
Msgr. Brady is not alone in attaching only a modicum of importance
to the fact that the result reached by the majority in Everson was an
upholding of the pluralistic concession. But in view of the nature of
the adjustment that has to be made, perhaps the result is as important
as the reasoning. There is something for everyone in Everson. No
adherent of the Offiicial Ethic could fail to be gratified by the vehemence with which the basic principle of separation of Church and
State is espoused. At the same time, a way is laid down whereby the
dissenter can be given all that the political authorities of a given state
are minded to give him. The "child benefit" theory is adequate to
support any kind of state reimbursement for the cost of attending nonpublic schools.
Meanwhile, as is shown both in McCollum and in the rationale
22. The Supreme Court seems never to have adopted the view that a person
is constitutionally entitled to exemption on account of his religious scruples from
a duty the State can impose on those who have no such scruples. See the handling
in West Virginia Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) of the earlier case
of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). On the other hand, it
has given a favorable reception to legislative adoption of exemptions based on
religious scruples. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).
23. The non-establishment clause of the First Amendment has, of course, considerable importance as an additional safeguard for the "free exercise" protected by
the next clause. But, as Fr. Murray points out, this context would not call for
the absolute application made in Everson and McCollum, but for an evaluation
of the impact of a given activity on freedom of exercise. Law or Prepossessions?,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 23 (1949). Passing to the Fourteenth Amendment, there
would seem to be analogous question as to whether the state action involved
deprives anyone of life, liberty or property. The Court seems to have subsumed this
question under that of standing, i.e., whether there is a case or controversy. It
would seem that these should be two different questions. See McCollum v. Board
of Ed., 333 U.S. 203, 232 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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chosen for Everson, the State continues to take no cognizance of religious organizations as such, but continues to approach them only
through the medium of the individual citizen. This is not pluralism as
the political theorists know it, although there seems to be little practical difference. 24 The Court, while adhering to the constitutional
framework whereby the Official Ethic is maintained as the state
ideology, has introduced a means whereby the dissenter can be given
scope for development, and for urging his needs in the proper placebefore his neighbors in the political forum. If he approaches with
temperance and reason the opportunity thus afforded, he may need no
more.
IV
These, then, are some of the factors that it would seem a criticism of
the Everson and McCollum cases ought to consider. Obviously, a historian with Msgr. Brady's qualifications could have given a more
authoritative account of the relevant historical considerations than
can this reviewer; it is a matter for regret that he has not done so.
But his failure is understandable: a reading of the opinions in question will indicate how easily one might be deceived into thinking
that the Justices were attempting to do exactly what Msgr. Brady has
done better. While the various opinions, particularly Jackson's in
Everson and Frankfurter's in McCollum, contain adequate statements
of the issues in their contemporary context, they are all interwoven
with appeals to the Founding Fathers. If the latter can be said to have
been used for the purpose Msgr. Brady attributes to them-that of supporting the respective opinions by an inexorable reasoning processthere is little doubt that Msgr. Brady is right in calling them specious.
But the judge is not what Msgr. Brady is, an objective observer of
history. He is a part of it, responsible for carrying it forward into
a context different from that in which it began. He thus marshals historical elements as leading up to his decision, not as compelling it.
Viewed in this light, the opinions under consideration are less flagrantly specious than Msgr. Brady considers them. While, like most
judicial opinions, they adhere to the fiction of inevitability, a person
familiar with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has little difficulty following them. They point to the type of evil that called forth
the constitutional provision involved in the case and then set out to
see if the governmental action complained of is productive of the same
type of evil. In this process, the judge is, to be sure, exercising a good
deal of discretion. He is picking from the Founding Fathers one principle that he will regard as governing the case, and ignoring other
principles that might also be discovered in the Founding Fathers, and
24. Cf. note 22 supra; Bradfield v. Roberts,
the State, and the School, 2o LAw & CONTEMP.

175 U.S. 291 (1899);
PROB. 184 (1955).

Gardner, Liberty,
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might also be regarded as governing the case. Some of the foregoing
material may serve to indicate what justification the authors of the
several opinions have and have not for picking one principle instead
of another.
Zorach v. Clauson 25 may shed some light on these considerations.
It will be noted that in that case all the talk is about pluralism. Again,
then, the judge is not trying to derive a principle of constitutional
law from language or history; he is stating the principle of constitutional law which, in the light of its development in our history
and of the convictions of the judge himself, he deems applicable. To
state the applicable principle is, of course, to decide the case. We
can only hope he will give a lucid explanation of why he deems it
applicable. While the Everson and McCollum opinions are not perfect
on this score, they are at least adequate.
V
But if neither history nor language dictates an inevitable result, on
what basis are the judges deciding the case? Jackson in McCollum says
this: "It is a matter on which we find no law but our own prepossessions." 26 After pointing out that Black, who speaks for the majority
in both cases, can be applying no different criterion, Msgr. Brady says:
"Of this explanation justice Black can hardly be proud, nor the Court
for which he speaks. With this explanation we, the American 'people
can hardly be content as we face the future with a Court proven, by
its own words, to be so dangerously unjudicial." 27 This statement seems
indicative of an attitude that is open to serious objection.
Jackson's remark seems to be no more than a grudging admission
that he and his colleagues are bringing to their task of constitutional
interpretation an ethical norm of which they are persuaded.2 s If we, the
American people, are to be discontented with the decisions thus arrived at, it will not be because they are unjudicial, but because they are
wrong. To illustrate with the now less controversial example of Dred
Scott, we are not surprised to find that Taney, who favored slavery,
rather than McLean, who opposed it, found in the ownership of slaves
by the Founding Fathers an obstacle to the inclusion of Negroes within
the ambit of the Constitution. Nor are we surprised to find that the
popular discontent with the decision was associated with a view of
slavery, not with a view of constitutional construction. Those of us who
see slavery as a moral evil have no difficulty in saying that the ownership of slaves by the Founding Fathers was a departure from the princiZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
25.

203,

238 (1948) (concurring

opinion).
27. Pp. 1.73-4.
28. Cf. the various opinions in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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ples they laid down for posterity-a departure which it is by no means
incumbent on us to perpetuate.
Taney's decision, then, was erroneous, but not unjudicial. His error
was in failing to regard slavery as a moral evil. Had he accepted the
correct moral view of slavery, even though he would not have refused
to give any recognition to the institution as he found it, he would have
read the Constitution in such a way as to favor in a given case the
claim to be free. In other words, it is generally acknowledged today
that our constitutional structure gives the judge a certain discretionary
authority over the positive law. He must consider in the light of his
own conscience both the scope of that authority and the direction in
which it is to be exercised. Where our institutions call for a detached
ethical judgment, he must make it.
Words like "due process of law" and even "establishment of religion"
are signals calculated to call forth just this ethical judgment and the
detached position in which the judge is placed by our federal Constitution is calculated to enable him to elicit it, informed by study
but unswayed by faction or favor. The delegation of such a role to
the judge, rather than to an official more responsive to political pressure, would seem appropriate to a conviction that there exists an ethical
standard of which the human conscience can inform itself by the use of
reason. Such a conviction seems to accord with the teachings of the
Catholic Church better than the view that the judge should blindly
follow the intentions of the Founding Fathers, regardless of the moral
validity of those intentions. The latter view would seem to require a
positivistic philosophy which Msgr. Brady would surely not want to
embrace.
To accept the role of the judicial conscience in giving effect to the
ethical content of the Constitution will be to put the instant controversy
on the only level on which a solution is possible. No amount of probing
into the views of Jefferson or Madison is going to convince a man that
the State can furnish bus fare to parochial school children, if he believes
that the very survival of the American Way of Life depends on discouraging Catholicism by all possible means short of actual persecution. Nor will he be persuaded of the constitutionality of the plan involved in McCollum, if he believes it can serve no conceivable purpose
except as the first step in a conspiracy to put the Pope in the White
House. But if Catholics, and any other religious groups in an analogous
position, show that our national life rests on a firmer foundation than
a common devotion to nonsectarianism, if they show that they have
deserved of America a better opportunity to develop in accordance
with their own principles than is afforded them by the nonsectarian
public school, they may hope for a generous response from the
judiciary, and from other Americans as well.
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